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[B]etween the frozen pole of egoism and the tropical expanse of utilitarianism
[there is] (...) the position of one for whom in a calm moment his neighbours
utility compared with his own neither counts for nothing, nor counts for one, but
counts for a fraction. (F.Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, 1881, Appendix
IV)
1 Introduction
As much as economists cherish the assumption that individuals are selsh, altruistic behav-
ior, such as gift giving, material assistance, and cooperation in social-dilemma-like situations,
is common. While such behavior may arise as an equilibrium outcome in an indenitely re-
peated interaction between selsh individuals many economists, including Edgeworth (1881)
and Becker (1974), have theorized that altruism exists. Most people would probably also
nd, by introspection, that they are willing to sometimes help others, even with no prospect
of future rewards. Not surprisingly, an extensive theoretical and empirical literature has de-
veloped to investigate how altruism a¤ects economic outcomes and how altruistic behaviors
are sustained.1 In this paper we shed new light on both questions, with a focus on family
ties.
Numerous empirical studies show that private transfers are more common within the
family than between unrelated households,2 and that such transfers appear to function as
a risk-sharing device.3 Intuition suggests that high levels of informal risk sharing within
the family are desirable. However, several researchers have o¤ered rather negative views of
the family. Thus, Baneld (1958) thought that the amoral familismthat he observed in
certain parts of Italy was an impediment to economic development. In a similar spirit, Max
Weber (1951) thought that the great achievement of [...] the ethical and ascetic sects of
Protestantism was to shatter the fetters of the sib [the extended family]. These religions
established [...] a common ethical way of life in opposition to the community of blood, even
1For a recent collection of surveys see Kolm and Ythier (2006)
2See Cox and Fafchamps (2008), and Fafchamps and Lund (2003).
3Cox, Galasso and Jimenez (2006) show that the average income of donor households exceeds that of
recipient households. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) nd that shocks a¤ect transfers between Filipino rural
households. Using data from Thailand, Miller and Paulson (1999) show that remittances respond to shocks
to regional rainfall.
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to a large extent in opposition to the family. (p.237)In his view, a strong sense of solidarity
among members of the extended family, coupled with a hostile attitude towards strangers,
promotes a culture where nepotism may thrive and counter the e¢ cient development of
markets.
Motivated by evidence that family ties vary in strength across cultures,4 we here pursue
the line of thought suggested by Weber, by theoretically analyzing the e¤ects of family ties
on risk-sharing and incentives. We address several questions, including: If family members
with higher earnings give transfers to those with lower incomes (and are willing and expected
to do so), what is the e¤ect of such family ties on incentives to exert productive e¤ort or
make productive investments? What is the most e¢ cient level of informal risk sharing, if
any? We are able to shed new light on these classical issues by allowing for mutual altruism
and an endogenous risk-reducing e¤ort, where the literature has focused either on models
with one-sided altruism, or on models with mutual altruism but without risk.
Furthermore, inspired by observations by Weber and others (see below) that family ties
may have grown weaker in northwestern Europe prior to the industrial revolution, we ask
whether the incentive e¤ect of family ties (in a society consisting mainly of subsistence
farmers) depends on the exogenously given environment.5 If so, may this have contributed
to the development of relatively weak family ties in certain parts of the world? We formally
address this question by determining evolutionarily robust degrees of altruism.
Our model is simple, but, we believe, canonical: two risk-averse siblings each choose a
costly risk-reducing action, e¤ort,that determines the probability distribution over output
levels. Once both siblingsoutputs have been realized, each sibling chooses whether to share
some of his or her output with the other.6 We model the motive for intra-family transfers
as altruism, modelled in the usual way as a positive weight placed on other family members
4Alesina and Giuliano (2007) use the World Values Survey to establish that family ties vary in strength
among di¤erent countries. Evidence based on rates of cohabitation between parents and their adult children
shows that such cohabitation is (on average ) viewed as an inferior good in the U.S. (Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
1993), but as a normal good in Italy (Manacorda and Moretti, 2006).
5In a companion sequel paper, Alger and Weibull (2008), we analyze these questions in a setting in which
family transfers are socially coerced rather than, as here, voluntary, and there we also compare the outcomes
with those in perfectly competitive insurance markets.
6Other researchers have taken the risk as given and focussed on the enforceability of transfers within
families; see, e.g., Coate and Ravallion (1993), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), Genicot and Ray (2003), and
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007).
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welfare. This particular game has not been studied before. Most of the literature on altruism,
starting with Becker (1974), assumes one-sided altruism (see also, e.g., Bruce and Waldman,
1990, Chami, 1998, and Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006). In models with two-sided altruism,
typically only one of the players chooses an e¤ort (see Laferrère and Wol¤, 2006, for a recent
survey), or there is no risk (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988, and Chen and Woolley, 2001).
In the case of equally altruistic siblings, an increase in the common level of altruism
leads to larger transfers, and thus a stronger free-rider e¤ect on e¤ort, but also to a stronger
empathy-e¤ect on e¤ort, by which we mean the desire to be able to help ones sibling if need
be. Which e¤ect dominates? It turns out that both e¤ects are absent when the common
degree of altruism is low, that the free-rider e¤ect outweighs the empathy e¤ect when the
common degree of altruism is of intermediate strength, and that the opposite holds when the
common degree of altruism is strong. Despite the non-monotonicity of e¤ort, with respect to
the common degree of altruism, siblings fare best, in terms of their expected material utility
 utility from consumption and e¤ort  when they are fully altruistic towards each other
(attaching the same weight to the others material utility as to their own). In particular,
their expected material utility is higher than if they had been completely selsh.
Although full altruism would lead to the (ex ante expected) Pareto e¢ cient outcome,
full altruism is not what we observe in reality.7 What level of intra-family altruism should
one expect, from rst principles? Here we follow in the footsteps of early proponents of
evolutionary theory, including Darwin, who were puzzled by the occurrence of altruism in
nature: how can a behavior or trait whereby the individual gives up resources for the benet
of others survive? Since then, biologists have developed theories of altruism, such as kinship
altruism (Haldane, 1955, and Hamilton, 1964a,b), reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), and
multilevel selection (Sober and Wilson, 1998). Our approach is closest to that of the British
biologist William Hamilton (1964a,b), and in a sense we generalize the so-called Hamiltons
rule, much along the same line as proposed by Bergstrom (1995). Hamiltons model, which
is particularly adapted to deal with interactions between relatives of the same generation
(Hamilton, 1964a, p.2), predicts that evolutionary forces will select for a degree of altruism
of approximately 1/2 between siblings. According to Hamilton This means that for a
hereditary tendency to perform an action [which is detrimental to individual tness] of this
7The large empirical literature on intra-family transfers was recently reviewed by Cox and Fafchamps
(2008). Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004), and Maitra and Ray (2003) nd fairly strong evidence that
transfers are driven by altruistic motives for low-income households, although there is no evidence that such
altruism would be anywhere near full altruism.
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kind to evolve the benet to a sib must average at least twice the loss to the individual.(op.
cit., p.16). Such an action would be benecial to inclusive tness,a notion introduced by
Hamilton in this article. This has become known as Hamiltons rule, and can be summarized
as the condition that the action in question will be taken if and only if rb > c, where c is the
reduction of the actors tness, b is the increase in the recipients tness, and r is Wrights
coe¢ cient of relationship, a coe¢ cient that is 1/2 between siblings (Wright, 1922).
When postulating his rule, Hamilton did not consider strategic aspects of the interaction
between kin. Ted Bergstrom (1995, 2003) enriched Hamiltons kinship selection theory by
allowing for precisely such aspects. Inspired by Bergstroms (1995, 2003) approach, we
develop a notion of local evolutionary robustness and apply this to the above-mentioned
pairwise sibling interaction. We show that neither complete selshness (no concern for
ones sibling), nor full altruism (equal concern for ones sibling as for oneself) is locally
evolutionarily robust in any environment. In the light of Hamiltons rule, at rst sight one
might conjecture the locally evolutionarily robust degree of altruism to equal one-half, the
coe¢ cient of relationship between the siblings. This would indeed be true in our model,
had e¤ort levels been exogeneously xed. However, we show that the strategic aspects
that endogeneously determine the siblingse¤orts pushes the locally evolutionarily robust
degree of altruism down, to a level below 1/2, and that it depends on the harshness of the
environment. An individual with sibling altruism 1/2 can be exploited by a more selsh
mutant sibling, and this tendency is stronger in harsher climates. As a result, family
ties should be expected to be weaker in harsher environments (or climates) than in milder
ones. This theoretical nding seems to be consistent with empirical observations that family
ties grew weaker in the harsh northwestern Europe prior to the industrial revolution (see
Section 6). Returning to Webers observation that Protestantism shattered the fetters of
the sib:if altruism is lower in the (usually harsher) climates of Protestant countries, then
Protestantism need not be the cause for weaker family ties, but the result of harsher climates
 chosen as a moral code for the looser family ties that typically prevail in harsh climates.
Indeed, some historians share the view that early Protestantism arose predominantly in areas
where traditional social norms and social expectations were at odds with the rules imposed
by Rome (see e.g. Ozment, 1974, 1992).
We are not aware of any work leading to these predictions. The closest is probably
Bergstrom (1995), mentioned above, who notes that a population consisting of individuals
who discount the tness benet bestowed on their siblings by one half would not resist an
invasion by mutants with a di¤erent discount factor (degree of altruism). Eshel and Shaked
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(2001) develop a model of partnerships, in which individuals may protect each other against
hazards in order to increase the likelihood of having someone around to help back in the
future. When considering interactions between relatives, however, Eshel and Shaked assume
that people use the genetic kinship factor, in accordance with Hamiltons rule.
Our base model is close to that by Arnott and Stiglitz (1991). They model family
insurance as transfers within pairs of ex ante identical individuals and they allow for an
endogenous, risk-reducing e¤ort taken by these individuals. However, whereas in our model
transfers within the family are driven by altruism, in their model family transfers are the
outcome of a joint agreement. In particular, if family members can observe each others
e¤ort, the joint agreement in their model species that total family income should always
be split equally and (in the case of observable e¤ort) the agreement species the e¤ort to be
taken. Mathematically, this is equivalent to the special case in our model of maximal family
altruism (when members attach the same utility weight to others welfare as to their own).
Moreover, they address a di¤erent question. They ask whether, in the presence of insurance
markets, supplemental informal insurance within the family improves welfare.
The topic we address here is also related to that in Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), who
analyze altruistic parentsincentive to instill a work norm in their children. The incentive
stems from parents inability to commit not to help their children if in nancial need. If
the children feel a strong social norm to work hard, then this reduces the risk that the
children will be in need, which is good for the altruistic parents. They focus on parent-child
interactions and do not carry out an evolutionary stability analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the
model, beginning with the case of a selsh atomistic individual and then introducing family
ties in terms of a two-stage game between two mutually altruistic siblings. In section 3
we characterize equilibria, and we conduct comparative-statics analyses of the equilibrium
outcome. In Section 4 we develop a notion of evolutionary robustness of family ties and
apply this to our model. Section 5 briey discusses evidence on family ties, and Section 6
concludes. All mathematical proofs have been relegated to an appendix.
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2 The model
2.1 Atomistic and selsh individuals
Consider an individual who feels no wish or social pressure to help others, living in an
environment where insurance is not available. The individual chooses an e¤ort level x 2 R+
that determines the probability distribution over the possible returns, or output levels. The
output is either high, yH , or low, yL = yH , where  < 1 is the factor by which output is
reduced in the badoutcome. As such,  represents output variability. With probability
 2 [0; 1) an exogenous hazard, such as a natural catastrophe, leads the output to being low;
the parameter  may also be interpreted as institutional quality, e.g., the probability with
which private property will be conscated. When this hazard does not strike, the output is
high with probability p and low with probability 1 p. The probability p 2 [0; 1] for the high
output level (when the exogenous hazard does not strike) is increasing (at a decreasing rate)
in the individuals e¤ort, p = ' (x), where ' : R+ ! [0; 1) is continuously di¤erentiable with
' (0) = 0, '0 > 0, '00 < 0 and ' (x) ! 1 as x ! +1. The parameter  > 0 represents the
ease with which e¤ort increases the probability of the high output: a higher  implies that the
e¤ort required to achieve a given success probability p is smaller: x = ' 1 (p) =. A higher
 may thus represent an easier environment, more skillful individuals and/or technological
progress. We will refer to  as the e¤ort return parameter. Note that, by assumption,
p = ' (x) < 1 for all  and x. In other words: it is impossible for any inidividual in any
environment to obtain the high output level for sure.
Since the low output level is achieved without any e¤ort, this is the output that nature
provides for free.By contrast, the high output level is the best that can be achieved with
e¤ort. In most of our comparative statics analyses, we will keep the high output level,
yH = Y > 0, xed while the three other environmentalparameters, , , and , vary. We
will usually refer to the triplet (; ; ) as the environment. We will say that an environment
(0; 0; 0) is harsher than another environment (; ; ) if the low output is lower (0  ),
the marginal return to e¤ort is smaller (0  ), and/or the probability of the exogenous
hazard is higher (0  ), with at least one strict inequality.
In a given environment, an e¤ort level x  0 results in the expected utility
(1  )' (x)u(Y ) + [(1  ) (1  ' (x)) + ]u(Y )  v (x) ; (1)
where u (y) is the utility from consuming an amount y > 0 and v (x) the disutility (or cost)
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of exerting e¤ort x  0. We assume that both u and v are twice di¤erentiable with, u0 > 0,
u00 < 0, v0  0, v00 > 0 and v0 (x) = 0 if and only if x = 0.
Alternatively, if the individual chooses his or her success probability p, at a cost or
disutility  (p), the expected utility can be written as
(1  ) pu(Y ) + [(1  ) (1  p) + ]u(Y )   (p) ; (2)
where u is dened as above and  can be derived from v and ' as follows:  (p) =
v (' 1 (p) =). The previous assumptions on v and ' imply that, for any given  > 0 the
disutility of maintaining a success probability p is increasing and strictly convex in p:  0  0
and  00 > 0, with  0 (p) = 0 if and only if p = 0, and  0 (p) ! +1 as p ! 1. The optimal
success probability p 2 (0; 1) is uniquely determined by the rst-order condition
 0 (p) = (1  ) [u(Y )  u(Y )] ; (3)
which simply requires that the marginal disutility of increasing the success probability should
equal the marginal benet thereof. We note that the success probability dened by (3) is
higher the higher is the variability  of the environment, and, when translating the model
specication back to the e¤ort-based model, the higher is the marginal return to e¤ort . In
the sequel we will use this model verions and let x0, p0, y0, and V 0 denote the e¤ort, success
probability, expected income, and expected utility of an atomistic and selsh individual.
2.2 Individuals with family ties
Now assume that these individuals still work individually but belong to families in which the
members have altruistic feelings towards each other. In case of unequal individual output
levels between siblings, those who obtained higher output may want to share some of their
output with less fortunate members.8 More precisely, assume now that there are two siblings,
A and B, who interact over two periods, along the lines of the model in the preceding
section. Thus, in the rst period, both siblings simultaneously choose their individual success
probabilities. Let p = (pA; pB) be the success-probability vector. The output yi of each
individual i = A;B is realized at the end of the rst period. The exogenous hazard, that
occurs with probability , is taken to be a common shock that brings both siblingsoutputs
8As will be shown below, an alternative interpretation is that family members are selsh but can sign
contracts on conditional transfers.
8
to the low level, Y . The probability for the output pair
 
yH ; yH

is thus (1  ) pApB, that
for
 
yH ; yL

is (1  ) pA (1  pB), that for
 
yL; yH

similarly is (1  ) (1  pA) pB, and that
for
 
yL; yL

is the residual probability. The higher  2 [0; 1] is, the stronger is the positive
correlation between the siblingsoutputs, ranging from statistical independence when  = 0
to perfect correlation (both outputs low) when  = 1.
At the beginning of the second period, the siblings observe each others outputs.9 The
state at the outset of period two is the vector ! = (yA; yB) 2 
 =

yL; yH
	2
. Having
observed the state !, both siblings simultaneously choose whether to make a transfer to the
other, and if so, how much. After these transfers have been made, the disposable income,
or consumption, of each sibling therefore equals his or her output plus any transfer received
from the other sibling minus any transfer given.
In this two-stage game, a pure strategy for player i 2 fA;Bg is a pair si = (pi;  i), where
pi 2 (0; 1) is i0s chosen success probability and  i : 
 !

0; yH

a function that species
what transfer, if any, to give in each state !. Each strategy prole s = (sA; sB) determines
the total utility to each sibling i = A;B in each state !:
Ui (s;!) = Vi (s;!) + iVj (s;!) ; (4)
where j 6= i. Here Vi is sibling is material utility,
Vi (s;!) = u(yi    i(!) +  j(!))   (pi)
and i 2 [0; 1] represents is degree of altruism of i towards his or her sibling.10 An individual
i with i = 0 will be called selsh and an individual with i = 1 fully altruistic. We solve this
two-stage game G by backward induction. Since all four states ! are reached with positive
probability under any strategy prole, all Nash equilibria are also sequential equilibria.
3 Equilibrium
In each state ! 2 
 at the beginning of the second stage, each sibling i wants to make a
transfer to the other if and only if his own marginal material utility from consumption is lower
9As will be seen later, our results are unchanged if the siblings also observe each others e¤orts.
10For ij < 1, Equation (4) can be shown to be equivalent with Ui being proportional to Vi (s;!)+iUj
for i = A;B, and j 6= i. Hence, for such parameter combinations, the current formulation is consistent with
pure(or non-paternalistic) altruism; see Lindbeck and Weibull (1988).
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than his siblings, when the latter is weighted by is degree of altruism. In order to make
his transfer decision, individual i also has to gure out whether the sibling is simultaneously
planning to give a transfer to him. All that matters to each sibling is the net transfer to the
other. It is straightforward to prove that, except for the case when both individuals are fully
altruistic, in equilibrium at most one sibling makes a transfer, and this transfer is uniquely
determined. Should both siblings be fully altruistic (A = B = 1), the transfers are not
uniquely determined, but the resulting allocation is uniquely determined. For each state !
2 
, let G(!) be the continuation game from the beginning of stage two on, a two-player
simultaneous-move game in which each players strategy is his or her transfer to the other
player.
Proposition 1 For each ! 2 
, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium of G(!). If
AB < 1, then this equilibrium is unique and at most one sibling makes a transfer. A
transfer is never made from a poorer to a richer sibling, and the size of the transfer does not
depend on the poorer siblings degree of altruism. If A = B = 1, then there is a continuum
of Nash equilibria, all resulting in equal sharing of the total output.
(Proof in the Appendix.) Let us spell this out in some detail. A positive equilibrium
transfer is hence made by a richsibling  a sibling with the high output Y  to a poor
sibling  a sibling with the low output Y . Let t () denote the transfer that a rich sibling
with altruism  gives in equilibrium to his or her poor sibling (whose degree of altruism
then does not matter). It follows from our assumptions that the transfer given is positive if
and only if the rich sibling is su¢ ciently altruistic in the sense that u0 (Y ) > u0 (Y ), or,
equivalently, if and only if  > ^ (), where
^ () := u0 (Y ) =u0 (Y ) 2 (0; 1) : (5)
For each  > ^ (), the transfer t 2 (0; Y ) is uniquely determined by the rst-order condition
u0 (Y   t) = u0 (Y + t) : (6)
In sum: the transfer T () that a rich sibling with altruism  2 [0; 1] makes to his or her
poor sibling is
T () = max ft; 0g , (7)
where t is dened by (6).
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We note that the equilibrium transfer function T : [0; 1] ! [0; Y ] is continuous, positive
if  > ^ (), and zero otherwise. Moreover, T is di¤erentiable for all  6= ^ (), with
T 0 () =   u
0 (Y + t)
u00 (Y   t) + u00 (Y + t) > 0 (8)
for all  > ^ (). Hence, as one would expect, a rich siblings transfer to his or her poor
sibling is strictly increasing in the rich siblings degree of altruism, for all degrees of altruism
above its critical lower bound for a transfer to occur, ^ ().
The following simple observations turn out to be useful for the subsequent analysis. First,
a rich sibling with altruism  2 (^ () ; 1) always remains richer than his or her poor sibling
also after the transfer:
cH = Y   T () > Y + T () = cL:
When  = 1, total output is shared equally: Y   T () = Y + T () for all  < 1 and
Y > 0.
Secondly, for a given level of altruism  > ^ () and high-output level Y > 0, the
equilibrium transfer is increasing in output variability: the higher  is (and therefore, the
higher the low output Y is), the smaller is T (). However, an increase in  (lowered
variability) is not fully o¤set by the decrease in the transfer: it leads to strictly higher
consumption levels for both siblings in the two states in which one sibling is rich and the
other poor. Formally:11
Proposition 2 : Both cH = Y   T () and cL = Y + T () are increasing in .
Remark 1 It is easily veried that the equilibrium transfers would have been the same, had
the siblings observed each otherse¤ort. This follows from the assumed additive separability
of material utility, see equation (2).
Turning to the rst period, in which the siblings simultaneously choose their individual
success-probabilities (or, equivalently, e¤orts), they both anticipate the subsequent transfers
11In a model with an altruistic parent and a selsh child, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko¤ (1997) showed
that an increase in the childs income by $1 would lead to a decrease of $1 in the parents transfer to the
child. This result was derived in a model where the parent makes transfers to the child in two subsequent
periods, and it hinges on the assumption that the child is liquidity constrained in the rst period. Hence,
proposition 2 is not in contradiction with their result.
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in each of the four possible states in the second period. The ex ante expected total utility for
each sibling i is thus a function of their choices of success probabilities:
Ui(pi; pj) = (1  ) pApB(1 + i)u (Y ) (9)
+ [(1  ) (1  pA)(1  pB) + ] (1 + i)u (Y )
+ (1  ) pi(1  pj)[u (Y   T (i)) + iu (Y + T (i))]
+ (1  ) pj(1  pi)[u (Y + T (j)) + iu (Y   T (j))]
   (pi)  i (pj) ;
for i = A;B and j 6= i. The four rst terms represent the distinct second-period states:
both being rich, both being poor, i rich and j poor, and i poor and j rich (for i = A;B and
j 6= i). The last two terms represent the two siblingsdisutility from e¤ort.
The pair (UA; UB) denes the (di¤erentiable) payo¤ functions in a two-player normal-
form game G in which a pure strategy for each player i is his or her success probability
pi 2 (0; 1). Each Nash equilibrium of the reduced-form game G induces a Nash equilibrium
of G, and vice versa. Without loss of generality, we may hence focus on the Nash equilibria
of G.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a strategy pair (pA; pB) 2 (0; 1)2 to constitute
a Nash equilibrium is that it satisfy the following generalization of the optimality condition
for the autarky case:12(
 0 (pA) = (1  ) [u(Y )  u(Y ) + g (pB; A; B)]
 0 (pB) = (1  ) [u(Y )  u(Y ) + g (pA; B; A)]
(10)
where, for any p; ;  2 [0; 1]:
g (p; ; ) = (1  p)  (u [Y   T ()] + u [Y + T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )])
 p  (u [Y + T ()] + u [Y   T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )]) : (11)
Just as in the autarky case (equation (3)), the equation system (10) requires that the marginal
cost of increasing ones success probability (or e¤ort) should equal the expected marginal
benet thereof.
Compared to the autarky case, here the marginal benet has a composite additional
term, given by the expression for g (p; ; ) given in (11). First, increasing ones success
12That these necessary rst-order conditions are also su¢ cient follow by the assumption  00 > 0, which
implies that each siblings expected total utility is concave in his or her own success probability, pi.
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probability increases the probability of being able to help ones sibling, should the sibling
become poor. This is the rst term in the expression for g (p; ; ). Second, increasing ones
success probability decreases the probability of being helped out by ones sibling, should the
sibling become rich. This is the second term.
The right-hand sides in the equation system (10) are decreasing a¢ ne functions of the
other siblings success probability. Hence, the higher ones siblings success probability, the
weaker is the incentive to increase ones own success probability. This disincentive e¤ect can
be decomposed into two components: when is siblings success probability (e¤ort) increases,
then (a) the probability that i will be put in a position to help, if successful, decreases, and
(b) the probability of being helped out if unsuccessful increases. We saw previously that
the transfer from a rich to a poor sibling is increasing in the level of altruism of the rich
sibling. Will a higher level of altruism therefore lead to lower levels of e¤ort, as suggested
by well-known results on moral hazard and insurance?
To answer this question, we rst ask how changes in the individual degrees of altruism
would a¤ect the equilibrium e¤orts. Thus, consider an increase in sibling is altruism: this
has only one e¤ect on the transfers, namely, that sibling i would make a larger transfer
to his sibling j should i be rich and j poor. Clearly, this should reduce js incentive to
provide e¤ort. But how about sibling i? Sibling i gets to keep less if he is rich and the
other poor intuitively this should have a negative impact on is e¤ort. However, sibling i
now also cares more about j, and this should have a positive impact. It turns out that the
latter, positive e¤ect always outweighs the former, negative e¤ect. This claim can be made
precise if the Jacobian of the equation system (10) is non-null, a condition that guarantees
local uniqueness of the equilibrium in question.
Proposition 3 Consider a Nash equilibrium (pA; p

B) of G
. If A; B < ^ (), then a
marginal change of A or B has no e¤ect on (pA; p

B). If (12) holds and i > ^ (), then
a marginal increase in i causes an increase in pi and a decrease in p

j (for i 2 fA;Bg and
j 6= i).
 00 (pA) 
00 (pB) 6= (1  )2
@g (pA; B; A)
@pA
@g (pB; A; B)
@pB
(12)
The intuition behind the proof given in the appendix is straightforward: if some transfer
is given with positive probability along the equilibrium path, then an individuals best reply
to any success probability that his or her sibling may choose is increasing in the individuals
own altruism, ceteris paribus. The motive is twofold: rst, to increase the chance to have
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something to give in case ones sibling obtains the low output, and, secondly, to decrease the
risk that ones sibling will need to give a transfer.13
In sum, a more altruistic individual not only gives a larger transfer, but also chooses a
higher probability of obtaining the high output level. We call this positive e¤ect of altruism
the empathy e¤ect (from own altruism). By contrast, an individual may choose a lower
success probability if the siblings altruism increases, ceteris paribus. This is the well-known
free-riding e¤ect of othersaltruism (here: ones siblings). If both siblings become more
altruistic, will the empathy or free-riding e¤ect dominate? We answer this question for the
case of equally altruistic siblings.
4 Equally altruistic siblings
Consider a pair of siblings with the same degree of altruism: A = B = . The game
G then has a unique symmetric equilibrium (p; p), where p 2 (0; 1) solves the following
equation, obtained from (10):14
 0 (p) = (1  ) [u(Y )  u (Y )] (14)
+(1  ) (1  p)  (u [Y   T ()] + u [Y + T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )])
  (1  ) p  (u [Y + T ()] + u [Y   T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )]) :
We rst consider a parametric example.
13Transfers are voluntary, but it is better for a sibling to be in a state in which both siblings receive the
high output.
14To see that the symmetric equilibrium is unique, note that, by hypothesis, the left-hand side is continuous
and increasing from zero to plus innity, while the right-hand side is a decreasing a¢ ne function with positive
intercept. The latter property becomes transparent after some algebraic manipulation: equation (14) can be
written in the simple form
 0 (p) = (1  ) [a  (1 + ) bp] ; (13)
for
a = u (Y   T ())  u (Y ) +  [u (Y + T ())  u (Y )]
and
b = u (Y + T ())  u (Y )  [u (Y )  u (Y   T ())] ;
where a; b > 0. That a is positive follows from our earlier observation that a donor remains richer than the
recipient (u (Y   T ()) > u (Y )). That b is positive follows from the concavity of u, implying that the
recipients material utility increases more from the transfer than the donors material utility decreases.
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4.1 Example
Let the success probability be an exponential function of e¤ort, ' (x) = 1  e x for  > 0,
and let material utility be log-linear in consumption and e¤ort: u(y)  v (x) = ln y   x for
 > 0, a parameter that represents the individuals distaste for e¤ort. The expected material
utility in autarky, written as a function of the success probability p, is then
lnY + [(1  ) (1  p) + ]  ln+ 

ln (1  p) : (15)
From (6) and (7) we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium transfer from a
rich individual with altruism  2 (0; 1) to her poor sibling:
T () = max

0;
  
1 + 

 Y: (16)
We note that this transfer is independent of the parameters  and  and that it is increasing
in , from zero for all  < ^ ()  , towards (1  )Y=2 as ! 1.15
The rst-order condition (14) for the success probability boils down to
(1  ) (1  p)

(1  p  p) ln

1 + 
1 + 

+ (  p  p) ln

 (1 + )
 (1 + )

  ln

=


(17)
For given parameter values, the left-hand side is a polynomial of degree two in p, with
paremeters ,  and , while the right-hand side is a constant, the ratio between the dis-
taste for e¤ort and the return to e¤ort. Figure 1 plots its solution, the equilibrium success
probability p () for = = 0:5 and  = 0, for  = 0:3 (the upper curve) and for  = 0:4
(the lower curve). When altruism is weak (  ), the siblings expect no transfers from each
other and therefore choose the autarky e¤ort. As  increases beyond , each sibling expects
to give (receive) a transfer, should he become rich (poor) and the other sibling poor (rich).
We note that the equilibrium success probability (or, equivalently, e¤ort) is non-monotonic
in altruism. We also note that in the harsher environment,  = 0:3, the equilibrium e¤ort
is higher for relatively selsh individuals (  ) than for relatively altruistic individuals
( > ). Hence, in such environments, altruism has a negative net incentive e¤ect on e¤ort
(and hence leads to lower expected incomes). By contrast, in the less harsh environment,
 = 0:4, very high degrees of altruism ( close to 1) has a positive net incentive e¤ect on
e¤ort. This is intuitively plausible, since in less harsh environments (those with higher ),
the autarky e¤ort is low and hence so is the marginal disutility of e¤ort. The free-rider
15Recall that the gross transfer is indeterminate at  = 1 while the net transfer is the same as when ! 1.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium success probability as a function of the common degree of altruism.
e¤ect is therefore weaker than in harsher environments  where the marginal cost of e¤ort
in autarky is higher. (The full analysis, leading up to equation (17), also accounts for the
empathy e¤ect.)
4.2 Altruism, the external environment and behavior
Does the non-monotonicity of the success probability p () in the above example hold gen-
erally? The answer is a¢ rmative: the free-riding e¤ect dominates at low degrees of altruism
while the empathy e¤ect dominates at high degrees of altruism. More precisely, the equilib-
rium success-probability decreases in  when  is at or just above ^ () and it increases in
 when  is near 1.
Proposition 4 Consider the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (p; p) of G. There is
an " > 0 such that p (^ ()) > p (^ () + ") and p (1  ") < p (1) for all " 2 (0; ").
This result is intuitively non-trivial. More altruistic individuals are, by denition, more
concerned about the external e¤ectsthat their behavior has on others (here, their sibling),
and hence the empathy e¤ect is stronger and free-riding e¤ect weaker on such an individuals
behavior when that individuals degree of altruism is increased. However, since here both
siblingsdegrees of altruism are increased (from the same initial value and by the same mar-
ginal amount), the incentive to free-ride on the siblings increased altruism is also stronger,
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so the net e¤ect is a priori ambiguous. The above proposition provides a clear-cut result
that holds for a wide class of utility functions u and  .
Next, let us briey consider the e¤ects of changes in the exogenous environment on the
success probability. Clearly, an increase in the harshness of the environment by way of either
an increase in the hazard probability , or a decrease in , the marginal return to e¤ort, leads
to a decrease in the equilibrium success probability.16 By contrast, an increase in output
variability  a decrease in   leads to an increase in the equilibrium success probability;
a generalization of what we saw in the example in Figure 1.
Proposition 5 Consider the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (p; p) of G for a given
value of  2 (0; 1). Increasing the harshness of the environment a¤ects p as follows: it is
decreasing in , increasing in , and decreasing in .
4.3 Altruism and material utility
Still in the special case of a common level of altruism , we note that a siblings expected
material utility in the unique symmetric equilibrium of G may be written as
V  () = (1  ) [p ()]2  u (Y ) + (1  ) [1  p ()]2 +   u (Y )
+ (1  ) p () [1  p ()]  [u (Y   T ()) + u (Y + T ())]
  [p ()] :
Using this expression it is straightforward to show that the common degree of altruism that
leads to the highest expected material utility in equilibrium is full altruism:
Proposition 6 V  (1)  V  () for all  2 [0; 1].
The intuition is simple: fully altruistic individuals completely internalize the external
e¤ect of their own behavior on their siblings material utility.17 Hence, siblingsincentives
16This follows from (10) and (11), where  is dened by  (p) = v
 
' 1 (p) =

. Hence, an increase in 
leads to a downward shift in  and  0.
17Assuming that the siblings are fully altruistic is mathematically equivalent to assuming that they are
selsh but make decisions collectively so as to maximize their joint expected material utility, as noted in
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), in a slightly di¤erent model.
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are perfectly aligned, with each sibling acting like a utilitarian social planner. For lower
degrees of altruism, however, their incentives are imperfectly aligned and there is room for
some free-riding. From this it is not di¢ cult to show that the expected equilibrium outcome
of the interaction between two equally altruistic siblings is ex ante Pareto-e¢ cient, in terms
of their (imperfectly or perfectly) altruistic preferences, if and only if both siblings are fully
altruistic.
Corollary 1 The symmetric Nash equilibrium (p () ; p ()) of G is Pareto e¢ cient if
and only if  = 1.
At rst sight, it may come as a surprise that the outcome is ine¢ cient even when the
siblings are purely selsh ( = 0). Why does not the independent strife of selsh individuals
lead to a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome? The explanation is that both individualsutility can be
increased by keeping their common success probability at its equilibrium level, but having the
rich sibling transfer a small amount to the poor sibling, whenever they end up with distinct
outputs. Such consumption smoothing across states is benecial, ex ante, because of the
assumed risk aversion (concavity in the utility from consumption). Hence, two selsh siblings
would like to write such an (incomplete and mutual) insurance contract, also involving their
e¤orts, had this been possible.
While very high levels of altruism thus are benecial, it is a non-trivial matter whether
moderate levels of altruism are benecial in terms of the expected material utility. As was
shown above, the success probability, and therefore also the expected output, declines as
altruism increases from an initially moderate level. It turns out, however, that the expected
material utility increases:
Proposition 7 There is an " > 0 such that V  [^ () + "] > V  [^ ()] for all " 2 (0; ").
5 Evolutionarily robust family ties
A pair of siblings would fare best, in terms of their expected material utility, if they both
were fully altruistic. But if sibling altruism is a trait that is inherited from parent to child
(where inheritance could be cultural or genetic), is such a high degree of altruism robust
against mutationstowards lower degrees of altruism? As mentioned in the introduction,
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Hamiltons rulesuggests that genetic evolutionary forces would favor a degree of altruism
equal to 1/2 between siblings, at least in the absence of strategic elements in their interaction.
In this section we investigate whether Hamiltons ruleholds up under the strategic sib-
ling interaction modelled here, or if it can be appropriately generalized. In this exploration,
we follow and extend somewhat Bergstroms (1995, 2003) approach. More specically, sup-
pose that a child (genetically or culturally) inherits either its fathers or its mothers degree of
sibling altruism (family values), with equal probability for both events, and with statisti-
cal independence between siblingsaltruism draws.18 Thus, if the fathers degree of altruism
is f and the mothers is m 6= f , then with probability 1=4 two siblings will both have
altruism f , with the same probability they will both have altruism m, and with probability
1=2 one sibling will have altruism f and the other m. As in Bergstroms (1995) model,
mating is monogamous and mate selection is random.19
5.1 Local evolutionary robustness
Consider a sequence of successive, non-overlapping generations, living for one time period
each. In each time period, those individuals who survived to the age of reproduction mate
in randomly matched pairs. Each pair has exactly two children, and each sibling pair plays
the game in section 2.2 once.20 In the rst generation, all individuals have the same degree
of sibling altruism  2 [0; 1]. Suppose that a mutationoccurs in the second generation:
a small population share of those who are about to reproduce switch to another degree of
altruism, 0 6= . Such a switch could be caused by genetic drift, a cultural shift in family
values, or it could be due to immigration of individuals with other family values. Random
18If the transmission is genetic, this corresponds to the sexual haploid reproduction case, where each
parent carries one copy of the gene, and the child inherits either the fathers or the mothers gene. The
human species uses sexual diploid reproduction: then each individual has two sets of chromosomes; one set
is inherited from the father, and the other from the mother. Whether a gene is expressed or not depends
on whether it is recessive (two copies are needed for the gene to be expressed), or dominant (one copy is
su¢ cient for the gene to be expressed). Bergstroms (2003) analysis of games between relatives shows that
the condition for a population carrying the same gene to resist the invasion by a mutant gene in the haploid
case is the same as the condition for a population carrying the same recessive gene to resist the invasion by
a dominant mutant gene in the diploid case.
19See Remark 2 below concerning assortative mating.
20Somewhat more generally, each pair may have an even number of children and they interact in pairs.
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matching of couples takes place as before and reproduction occurs. We call the incumbent
degree of altruism  evolutionarily robust against 0 if a child carrying the incumbent degree
of altruism obtains, on average, a higher material utility than a child carrying the mutant
degree, for all su¢ ciently small population shares of the mutantdegree of altruism, 0.
The incumbentdegree  is evolutionarily robust if this holds for every 0 6= .21
Let V (; ) denote the expected material utility to an individual with altruism  whose
sibling has altruism . In particular, V (; )  V  (). As we will presently see, the
condition for the above-mentioned incumbent degree of altruism  to be evolutionarily robust
against a mutant degree 0 6=  boils down to the following inequality:
V () >
1
2
[V (0; ) + V (0)] : (18)
Formally, we dene a degree of sibling altruism  2 [0; 1] to be evolutionarily robust if it
meets (18) for all 0 6= .22
To see that (18) indeed is necessary and su¢ cient for evolutionary robustness as infor-
mally dened above, note that the left-hand side, V (), approximates the expected material
utility to a child with the incumbent degree of altruism, . For if the population share of
mutants in the parent generation, " > 0, is close to zero, then with near certainty both
parents of this child are -altruists, implying that the childs sibling almost surely also is
an -altruist. Likewise, the expression on the right-hand side approximates the expected
material utility to a child with the mutant degree of altruism, 0. Because for " close to zero,
such a child almost certainly has exactly one parent with the mutant degree of altruism
(the probability that both parents are mutants is an order of magnitude smaller, "2, and the
probability that none is, is zero). Therefore, with probability close to 1=2 this childs sibling
21This notion is similar to that of an evolutionarily stable (pure or mixed) strategy in a nite and symmetric
two-player game; a population using such a strategy is robust against a small-scale invasion of any mutant
strategy in the sense of earning a higher expected payo¤ in the post-entry population, see Maynard Smith
(1982).
22Bergstrom (1995, 2003) derives a condition similar to (18) in a slightly di¤erent model, in which each
individual is programmed to play a strategy in a symmetric two-player game. Bergstrom shows that for a
sexual haploid species, a su¢ cient condition for a population consisting of x-strategists to be stable against
a small invasion of y-strategists is
(x; x) >
1
2
(y; x) +
1
2
(y; y):
where (s; s0) denotes the payo¤ to strategy s against strategy s0.
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has the incumbent degree of altruism, , and with the complementary probability the sibling
has the mutant degree of altruism, 0.
The process by which mutations appear in a population may a¤ect the extent to which
the mutant degree of altruism di¤ers from the incumbent degree. In particular, cultural
drift in values in a society may arguably lead to smaller di¤erences between incumbents
and mutants, while immigration from another community or society may sometimes give rise
to larger such di¤erences. The relevant evolutionary robustness criterion against cultural
driftthus is a local version of the above denition. We will call a degree of altruism  2 [0; 1]
locally evolutionarily robust if inequality (18) holds for all 0 6=  near . Formally:
Denition 1 A degree of altruism  2 [0; 1] is locally evolutionarily robust if (18) holds for
all 0 6=  in some neighborhood of .
Let us elaborate the notions of evolutionary robustness and local evolutionary robustness
a bit. First, note that a degree of altruism  is evolutionarily robust if and only if the
right-hand side of (18), viewed as a function of 0 2 [0; 1], has its unique global maximum
at 0 = . Second, a degree of altruism  is locally evolutionarily robust if and only if the
right-hand side of (18), again viewed as a function of 0 2 [0; 1] has a strict local maximum
at 0 = . Third, let A be the degrees of altruism  2 [0; 1] such that V : [0; 1]2 ! R is
di¤erentiable at the point (; ), and dene D : A ! R by
D () = V1(; ) +
1
2
V2(; ), (19)
where Vk is the partial derivative of V with respect to its kth argument, for k = 1; 2.
If the incumbent degree of altruism in a society is  2 A, then D () d is the marginal
e¤ect of a slight increase in a mutants degree of altruism, from  to  + d, on its childs
expected material utility (achieved in the childs equilibrium play with its sibling) if the child
inherits its mutant parents degree of altruism. The rst term is the e¤ect of an increase
in the childs own altruism on his or her expected material utility, whereas the second term
is the e¤ect of an increase in the childs siblings altruism, multiplied by one half  the
conditional probability that the sibling also is a mutant (in the limit as " ! 0). We will
refer to the function D as the evolutionary drift function.
If D () > 0, then the mutant child, if slightly more altruistic than the incumbent
population, will outperform the incumbentschildren in terms of expected material utility.
Likewise, if D () < 0, then it is instead a mutant child who is slightly less altruistic than the
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incumbents that will outperform the incumbentschildren. Hence, in order for an incumbent
degree of altruism  2 A to be locally evolutionarily robust it is necessary that D () = 0.
Let int (A)  A be the set of interior points in A, that is, degrees of altruism  such that V 
is continuously di¤erentiable at all points (0; 0) near (; ). For such degrees of altruism
more can be said:23
Proposition 8 A necessary condition for a degree of altruism  2 A to be locally evolu-
tionarily robust is D () = 0. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a degree of altruism
 2 int (A) to be locally evolutionarily robust is (i)-(iii), where:
(i) D () = 0
(ii) D (0) > 0 for all nearby 0 < 
(iii) D (0) < 0 for all nearby 0 > 
In other words: wherever the evolutionary drift function is well-dened, a necessary
condition for local evolutionary robustness is that there be no drift, and, that there be
upward (downard) drift at slightly lower (higher) altruism levels.
Remark 2 We have assumed random matching when couples form. Suppose, instead, that
mutants have a tendency towards assortative mating: with probability  2 [0; 1] a given
mutant will be selective, settle only for a match with another mutant, while with the comple-
mentary probability 1   , the mutant will be non-selective and have a random match. For
a small population share " > 0 of mutants, the conditional probability that the sibling to a
child with the mutant degree 0 of altruism will also have altruism 0 is then approximately
equal to (1  ) =2 +  (instead of 1=2). The evolutionary robustness condition (18) then
generalizes to
V () >
1
2
[(1  )V (0; ) + (1 + )V (0)] ; (20)
and the drift function D becomes
D () = V1(; ) +
1
2
(1 + )V2(; ). (21)
This boils down to (19) in the limit case of fully random matching and gives D () =
V1(; ) + V2(; ) in the case of fully assortative matching.
23This follows from the fact that local evolutionary robustness is equivalent with local strict maximization
of the right-hand side of (18).
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5.2 Application to the present sibling interaction
When applied to the sibling interaction analyzed in sections 2-4 above, we rst note that
the expected equilibrium material utility to an individual with altruism  and with a sibling
with altruism  is
V (; ) = (1  ) p (; ) p (; )u (Y ) (22)
+ [(1  ) [1  p (; )] [1  p (; )] + ]u (Y )
+ (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]u [Y   T ()]
+ (1  ) [1  p (; )] p (; )u [Y + T ()]   [p (; )] ;
where p : [0; 1]2 ! (0; 1) is a function that to each pair of sibling altruism levels, (; ),
associates the equilibrium success probability of the -altruist.24 Thus, if an individual has
altruism  and his or her sibling has altruism , then p (; ) is the individuals own success
probability and p (; ) that of the sibling. Such a pair of success probabilities necessarily
satisfy the system of equations (10). It follows from (22) that the set A, i.e., the degrees
of altruism  2 [0; 1] such that V is di¤erentiable at the point (; ), consists of those
degrees of altruism  2 [0; 1] that are such that p is di¤erentiable at (; ), and has partial
derivatives, p1 (; ) and p

2 (; ), with respect to the rst and second argument of the
function p.25 Recall from proposition 3 that p1 (; ) > 0 and p

2 (; ) < 0 whenever
;  > ^ (). Straight-forward calculations based on (22) and the envelope theorem lead to:
Proposition 9 For any  2 int (A):
D () = (1  ) p (; ) (1  p (; ))  F () (23)
+(1  ) [(1=2  ) p1 (; ) + (1  =2) p2 (; )] G ()
where
F () =

1
2
u0 [Y + T ()]  u0 [Y   T ()]

T 0 ()
24We restrict attention to cases in which there is a unique equilibrium. Uniqueness holds, for instance, in
the parametric example in Section 3.1 (for details, see Alger and Weibull, 2007). The uniqueness assumption
will, in fact, be used only when  and  are (innitesimally) close to each other.
25See, e.g., Theorem 39.6 in Bartle (1976). A su¢ cient condition for the di¤erentiability of V ,at a point
(; ) 2 (0; 1)2, is that both partial derivatives, p1 and p2, exist and are continuous on a neighborhood of
(; ) (see, e.g., Theorem 39.9 in Bartle, 1976).
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and
G () = p (; )  (u (Y )  u [Y   T ()]) + [1  p (; )]  (u [Y + T ()]  u (Y )) :
We are now in a position to derive a number of results. These results turn on whether
or not ^ () < 1=2, that is, whether or not the critical degree of altruism for a transfer to
occur is lower than Wrights coe¢ cient of relationship between the siblings. Write
^ =
1
Y
(u0) 1 [2u0 (Y )] : (24)
Then ^ () < 1=2 if and only if  < ^.
We will say that the environment is gentle if  > ^. In such an environment, the
marginal utility at the low output is so close to the marginal utility at the high output
level that siblings with altruism  = 1=2 do not give any transfers to each other. Hence,
their e¤orts are the same as in autarky. It follows that no degree of altruism   1=2 is
evolutionarily locally robust in gentle climates, since a mutant sibling with altruism 0 near
 does not give any transfer either, and hence it obtains the same expected material utility
as a sibling with the incumbent degree of altruism, .26
A more interesting, and arguably empirically more relevant case is when  < ^. In such
volatile environments, siblings with altruism   1=2 give voluntary transfers to each other
in states when one is rich and the other poor. In the light of Hamiltons rule (Hamilton,
1964a), one might expect  = 1=2 to then be the robust degree of kinship altruism. However,
in the strategic interaction between siblings studied here, only lower degrees of altruism can
be evolutionarily robust:
Proposition 10 Suppose that  < ^. If  2 int (A) is locally evolutionarily robust, then
^ () <  < 1=2.
This result is due to the strategic externality that one siblings altruism exerts on
the others choice of e¤ort: each sibling optimally adjusts its productive e¤ort not only to
the exogenous environment but also to the anticipated transfer from the other sibling. To
see this, suppose that both siblingssuccess probabilities were xed, at some exogenously
given level. What levels of sibling altruism  would then be evolutionarily robust? Would
Hamiltons rule apply? An application of proposition 8 provides the answer:
26In su¢ ciently gentle environments, mutants who are more altruistic than the incumbents and give
transfers fare worse than the incumbents: D (0) < 0 for all 0 >   ^ ().
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Corollary 2 Suppose that  < ^ and that e¤orts are exogenously xed and equal. Then the
unique evolutionarily robust degree of sibling altruism is  = 1=2.
However, in the present model, the success probabilities are endogenous  they are
choosen by each sibling, and this choice depends, in general, on the siblings degrees of
altruism, as well as on the exogenous environment (; ; ), where  is the ratio of the low to
the high output,  the marginal return to e¤ort, and  the probability of a common negative
shock. Hence, which degrees of sibling altruism are locally evolutionarily robust, if any, may
depend on the environment. Given the analytical complexity of analyses of this and related
questions, we resort to numerical simulations of the example in Section 4.1.
5.3 The external environment and altruism
Here we use the parametric example in Section 4.1 to explore how the environment may a¤ect
the evolutionary robustness of di¤erent degrees of altruism, and thereby indirectly also e¤ort,
income, and material welfare. We note that, logarithmic utility from consumption implies
that ^ = 1=2 (see equation (24)). In order to keep the number of parameters down, we
henceforth set  = 1.
Figure 2 shows the graph of the evolutionary drift function D, with the common degree
of altruism, , on the horizontal axis, for  = 0 and  = 2. The two graphs correspond to
 = 0:2 and  = 0:3, respectively, where the rst represents a harsher environment than the
second. Each curve has a discontinuity at its -value (recall that ^ () = ). We see that the
evolutionary drift, D (), is zero for all  < ^ (). At ^ () <  < 1=2, D () jumps up to a
positive value, from which it declines continuously from positive to negative, as  increases
towards unity. According to Proposition 8, the intersection of the downsloping curve and the
horziontal axis gives the unique locally evolutionary robust degree of sibling altruism. At
lower (higher) degrees of sibling altruism there is upward (downward) evolutionary drift. We
note that the evolutionarily robust degree of altruism is lower in the harsher environment.
A qualitatively similar e¤ect is found when output variability  and the return to e¤ort 
are held xed, and one instead varies the probability of a common negative shock, . Figure
3 again shows the graph evolutionary drift function, but now for two di¤erent values of ,
where  = 0:5 represents a harsher environment than  = 0 (in both cases  = 0:2 and
 = 2). Although the evolutionary drift function is (pointwise) non-monotonic in , we
see that, again, the unique evolutionarily robust degree of altruism is lower in the harsher
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Figure 2: The evolutionary drift D () for di¤erent output variabilities:  = 0:2 (left curve)
and  = 0:3 (right curve).
Figure 3: The evolutionary drift D () for di¤erent probabilities of the exogenous shock:
 = 0, and  = 0:5 (the steeper curve).
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Figure 4: The evolutionarily robust degree of altruism as a function of  and .
environment.
We nd a similar e¤ect when output variability  and the probability  of a common
negative shock are held xed: a harsher climate in the form of a lower return to e¤ort  then
leads to a lower robust degree of altruism (the gure is omitted).
Figure 4 shows the robust degree of altruism as a function of the environmental parame-
ters  and , with  held constant (at zero). We see again how the evolutionary forces, as
modelled here, select for lower degrees of altruism in harsher environments. This observation
might, at rst sight, appear counter-intuitive, since risk sharing would seem to have a larger
survival value in harsher environments. While this may be true, it may also be that very
altruistic populations are more vulnerable to the invasion by slightly less altruistic mutants
the harsher is the environment. To see this, consider a relatively altruistic individual who
has a more selsh sibling. The altruistic individual su¤ers doubly from the selshness of his
or her sibling: the selsh sibling both makes a lower e¤ort (Proposition 3) and gives a lower
transfer if need be. The altruistic individual is thus more likely to have to help his sibling
out, is less likely to be helped out, and receives a lower transfer upon being helped out, than
if his sibling had been like him. In harsher environments, both siblings make higher e¤orts
(Proposition 5). Hence, a high degree of altruism may be more vulnerable to selsh mutants
in harsher environments.
In sum: our numerical simulations suggest that modest degrees of family altruism will
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Figure 5: The equilibrium e¤ort x as a function of environment (; ; 0) and for robust
altruism levels.
prevail in most environments (between 0.2 and 0.5), with higher degrees of family altruism
in milder than in harsher climates. In this sense, Darwin lends theoretical support to Weber,
in so far as Protestantism is more prevalent in harsher climates and Catholicism in milder
climates: evolutionary forces seem to select stronger family ties in milder climates, such as in
southern (and mostly Catholic) Europe, than in harsher climates, such as in northern (and
mostly Protestant ) Europe.
Based on these simulations, we have calculated the equilibrium e¤ort and income as
indirect functions of the environment (; ; ), by letting the degree of sibling altruism adapt
to its unique evolutionarily robust value in each environment. Figure 5 shows e¤ort, x, as
such an indirect function of the environment (; ; ), with  = 0. For a given value of ,
siblings (with the corresponding evolutionarily robust degree of altruism) exert more work
e¤ort in environments with higher output variability (lower ). In harsher environments
in this sense, their family ties are weaker and they work harder. For an outside observer,
it is thus as if those who live in milder climates are lazier than those who live in harsher
climates, while in all these simulations all individuals actually have identical preferences
concerning e¤ort (we have set the distaste for e¤ort, , equal to one in all simulations).
Max Weber (1904-1905) argued that the Protestant work ethicwas a key element behind
the development of capitalism in northwestern Europe and the United States. Our results
suggest that such a work ethic may actually just be a social codication of attitudes that
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Figure 6: Equilibrium income Y  as a function of environment (; ; 0) for robust altruism
levels.
naturehas already selected for individuals living in harsher climates.
The e¤ect of , the return to e¤ort, is not as clear-cut: for some values of , the equi-
librium e¤ort, as an indirect function of the environment, is non-monotonic in . This is
due to two opposing e¤ects, a sort of substitution e¤ect and a sort of income e¤ect. Ceteris
paribus, an increase in  has a positive incentive (substitution) e¤ect, but in the new and
slightly milder climate, the robust level of altruism is a bit higher, and this has a disincentive
(income) e¤ect on e¤ort; for all values of  in Figure 5, the equilibrium e¤ort level, given
the associated robust degree of altruism (adapted to that climate), is lower than the autarky
e¤ort level. Note that the same can be said in terms of technological innovations in a xed
environment: increased skill (higher , say, by means of new tools) may result in higher or
lower e¤ort, once family values have adapted to the change in skills.
The higher e¤ort exerted in harsher environments is not always su¢ cient to yield higher
average incomes. Indeed, when family ties adapt to the environment, the expected income
may decrease as the environment becomes harsher, see gure 6. Furthermore, even if the
expected income sometimes is higher in harsher environments (with lower , say), and peo-
ple thus are richer, they need not be happier, their expected material utility may be
lower. Figure 7 shows the expected material utility when family ties have adapted to the
unique robust degree of sibling altruism in each environment. Since, moreover, altruism is
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Figure 7: Equilibrium material utility V  as a function of environment (; ; 0) for robust
altruism levels.
lower in harsher environments, this implies that the expected utility also is lower in harsher
environments.
Our general analysis showed that increased sibling altruism has a non-monotonic e¤ect
on e¤ort. This prompts the question whether e¤ort, and thus also the expected individual
incomes after transfers, are higher or lower at the evolutionarily robust level of sibling altru-
ism, than if both siblings had been selsh. In the environments in Figures 5 and 6, transfers
occur, from a rich sibling to a poor, at the corresponding evolutionarily robust degree of
altruism. Figure 8 shows that in all the considered environments, the moral-hazard e¤ect
dominates the empathy e¤ect: there is a positive di¤erence between Y 0, the expected income
in autarky, and Y , the expected income at the evolutionarily robust altruism. Furthermore,
the absolute income reduction is higher in harsher climates, despite the lower level of al-
truism there. However, although altruism (at the evolutionarily robust level in the given
environment) thus has a negative e¤ect on expected income, it does increase welfare  the
expected material utility. As seen in Figure 9, the di¤erence between V , the expected ma-
terial utility at the evolutionarily robust degree of altruism, and V 0, the expected material
utility in autarky, is positive. Moreover, the absolute gain from altruism in material utility
is larger in harsher climates, despite the lower level of altruism in such climates.
Remark 3 Using the expression in (21), it is straightforward to verify that an increase in
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Figure 8: The di¤erence Y    Y 0 in expected income with and without family ties, as a
function of the environment (; ; 0), for robust altruism levels.
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Figure 9: The di¤erence V    V 0 in expected material utility with and without family ties,
as a function of environment (; ; 0), for robust altruism levels.
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, the degree of assortative mate selection, leads to an upward shift in the drift function
D. Hence, assortative mating increases the evolutionarily robust degree of altruism. For
example, for the parametric example in Section 4.1 with (; ; ) = (2; 2; 0), the evolutionarily
robust degree of sibling altruism is approximately 0.37 under random mating,  = 0, and
approximately 0.62 when  = 0:5. When mutants are more likely to bestow the benets from
their own altruism on other mutants, as is the case if  is one half rather than zero, the
marginal value of a mutation towards a slightly higher level of altruism is higher, and the
evolutionarily robust degree of altruism is higher. To us, it is an open question whether or
not there is assortative mating under gradual evolutionary drift in family values, so we feel
more condent in predictions assuming little or no assortative mating.
6 Evidence on family ties
Our theoretical analysis focuses on the family as a potential source of mutual insurance, and
on the mixed incentive e¤ect on individual e¤ort from such potential mutual help within the
family. Here we summarize some of the evidence for such phenomena. We also discuss empir-
ical studies by social scientists from di¤erent academic disciplines (economics, anthropology,
sociology and history), studies suggesting that family ties are weaker in some societies than
in others, and that such di¤erences may have predated the industrial revolution. We argue
that the evidence is in line with the qualitative predictions of our model, namely, that family
ties are stronger in less harsh environments.
First, there is evidence that transfers within the extended family are a source of insurance
in countries where formal insurance is less well developed.27 In a survey on private transfers
between households, Cox and Jimenez (1990) conclude that in developing countries 20-90%
of households receive (private) transfers from other households (mostly within the same
extended family), which can represent up to 20% of the average household income. In the
U.S. the corresponding gures are 15% and 1%, respectively. Since the average income of
donor households exceeds that of recipient households (Cox, Galasso and Jimenez, 2006),
these transfers appear to provide some insurance; see also Cox and Fafchamps (2008). Several
other studies, such as Udry (1990), Towsend (1994), Miller and Paulson (2000), and Kurosaki
and Fafchamps (2002), conrm the hypothesis that insurance occurs within the extended
27In 2003 the total value of insurance premia (life and non-life) as a percent of GDP was 12.48 in the US,
9.85 in France, 1.42 in Turkey, and 1.74 in Mexico (Insurance Statistics Yearbook: 1994-2003, OECD, 2005).
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family.
Second, there is some evidence in that the degree of intra-family insurance a¤ects ef-
fort. Despite the previously strong emphasis in the theoretical literature on the possible
moral-hazard e¤ect of intrafamily altruism (see Laferrère and Wol¤, 2006, for a survey),
there seems to be a limited number of empirical studies on this topic. Two of those stud-
ies suggest that mutual insurance within the extended family induces moral hazard. Using
data on farmer output in Mali, Azam and Gubert (2005) establish that recipients of re-
mittances from emigrated relatives in Mali decrease their e¤ort in response to an increase
in remittances. Similarly, the analysis of Thai data by Miller and Paulson (1999) reveals
that better insurance in the form of remittances leads to more gambling, both among those
who are potential remitters, and among those who are likely to receive remittances. By
contrast, the ndings by Kohler and Hammel (2001) indicate that mutual insurance within
the family may have a positive e¤ect on individualsrisk-reducing e¤ort. Using census data
for Slavonia from 1698, Kohler and Hammel nd that the number of di¤erent crops grown
by a nuclear family tended to increase as the grain resources available within the extended
family network (relative to the households own land resources, and controlling for physical
distance) increased. The authors were expecting the opposite e¤ect, namely that as a result
of an increase in the amount and proximity of resources available for risk pooling within the
extended family, a household would invest less in risk-reducing planting strategies. However,
our results provide an explanation for this pattern: when a family expects to help another
family out, the expected benet of the risk-reducing planting strategy is increased. The situ-
ation investigated by Azam and Gubert is perhaps closer to a model with one-sided altruism:
with remittances, essentially only the emigrant family member is in a position to help out
the family that stayed in the home country. Hence, the only e¤ect of family altruism on
the latter is the free-riding e¤ect, inducing lower e¤ort. By contrast, Kohler and Hammel
studied households living in the same area, suggesting that any household could end up as
a donor or a recipient of transfers.
Finally, there is evidence for geographic variations in the strength of family ties. U.S.
data collected by Keefe et al (1979) indicates that second and third generation Mexican-
American families have stronger kin ties than white Anglo families, even after controlling for
variables such as education, occupation and the number of years of residence in the same city.
Keefe (1984) further nds that Mexican-Americans (people of Mexican descent but born in
the U.S.) attach a larger value than Anglos to the physical presence of family members.
Using another data set, Gonzales (1998) shows that Mexican-Americans tend to live closer
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to and have more contact with kin than Anglos, even after several generations in the U.S.
Her analysis further suggests that both Mexican-Americans and Mexican immigrants are
signicantly more sympathetic to the idea that parents (adult children) should let their
adult children (parents) live with them if in need. This evidence is consistent with our
predictions, since on average the climate in Mexico is arguably milder than in the U.S. It
also indicates that the strength of family ties perdures for several generations, and that
current data may be interpreted as a reection of the past. Thus, to the extent that the
prevailing strength of family ties in the U.S. may be the result of immigration from all over
Europe, and that we may expect the climate of the representative immigrants country of
origin to be harsher than in Mexico, these ndings indicate that family ties are stronger in
milder climates.
Reher (1998) argues that one can measure the strength of a societys family ties by
studying the age at which a child leaves his/her parentshome. In 1995, the average age of
children living with their parents was 15 in Spain, 18 in Italy, 9 in the UK, 11 in the US,
and 13 in Germany (Bentolila and Ichino, 2000). Although these di¤erences may be a¤ected
by di¤erences in economic opportunities, availability and cost of housing, and the extent
of publicly provided insurance, there is evidence that preferences for cohabitation between
parents are children vary among countries. Using U.S. data Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)
analyzed how the rate of cohabitation between parents and their adult children responded
to an exogenous increase in the parentsincome: they found that the rate of cohabitation
decreased as a result of the increase in the parents income. Thus, cohabitation between
parents and adult children is may be viewed as an inferior good in the U.S. But in other
countries it is a normal good: using Italian data Manacorda and Moretti (2006) found that
the rate of cohabitation between parents and their adult children increased as a result of
an exogenous increase in the parentsincome. Again, this is consistent with our predictions
that family ties are stronger in less harsh climates.
Apart from Webers suggestion that Protestantism has shattered the fetters of the sib,
the direct evidence from pre-industrial Europe is scarce. However, the little evidence there
is appears to be consistent with our theoretical predictions. Hajnal (1982) reports data on
servants in northwestern Europe during the 17th-19th centuries; approximately half of all
youngsters served outside the parental home at some point, some leaving the parents at the
age of 10. Thus, in 17th century England, the unit of production was the husband and the
wife and hired labor, not children(Macfarlane, 1978). By contrast, in southern and eastern
Europe, hired labor was in the same period scarce and children would typically work on the
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parentsfarm; several related couples and their children would then constitute an extended
household. Finally, di¤erences in the legal systems may provide further insights into the
strength of family ties. In England, parents had the right to bequeath or sell their assets
to anyone. According to Macfarlane (1992), this right may be traced back to the thirteenth
century. By contrast, in France the heirs must be given the opportunity to purchase the
assets (Macfarlane, 1992).
7 Conclusion
Family ties are stronger in some parts of the world than in others and this may have been
so for a long time. It seems that family ties grew weaker in northwestern Europe prior to
the industrial revolution, as noted by Weber (1951). This observation prompted us to ask
rst, how family ties a¤ect economic outcomes, and second, whether evolutionary forces may
have shaped family ties di¤erently in di¤erent environments. With a preindustrial world in
mind, we focused on the familys role as an insurance provider for its members. We modelled
a family as a pair of mutually altruistic siblings, who may provide insurance to each other
by way of voluntary transfers. In the literature on market insurance and moral hazard the
risk-reducing e¤ort is decreasing in the extent of market insurance. By contrast, we found
that the risk-reducing e¤ort is non-monotonic in the extent of family insurance. This non-
monotonicity was seen to be the result of two opposing e¤ects of altruism on e¤ort, the
free-riding e¤ect and the empathy e¤ect. This theoretical nding calls for more empirical
studies on the e¤ect of family ties on e¤ort, of which there currently exists only a fairly small
number (see Section 6).
In a preindustrial society, most people make their living as subsistence farmers and
hunters, the output from which is determined jointly by their e¤orts and the environment in
which they live. In our model we included three environmental factors: the marginal return
to e¤ort, and local and global output variability, respectively. For a given level of intra-family
altruism, we studied how these environment factors a¤ect individual family memberspro-
ductive e¤orts. Our evolutionary analysis showed that neither very weak nor very strong
family ties are robust against drift in the strength of family ties. As expected, full altruism
 giving equal weight to a siblings material welfare as to ones own  was seen to be non-
robust. If a few individuals in a large population would become slightly less altruistic toward
their kin, these mutantswould do better in terms of material welfare. More surprising,
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perhaps, is our nding that this negative result also holds for the degree of altruism dictated
by Wrights degree of relationship (1/2 for siblings, 1/8 for cousins etc.). If a few individuals
in such a society would become slightly less altruistic towards their kin, then these individ-
uals would in fact do better in terms of material utility.28 We showed how this deviation
from Hamiltons rule(Hamilton, 1964a) disappears if one freezes family memberse¤orts.
We developed a generalized version of Hamiltons rule (Proposition ) and used this to show
that, with endogeneous productive e¤orts, intermediate degrees of family altruism are robust
in many environments. The harsher the environment, the weaker are the family ties. We
view this as a Darwinian explanation of Max Webers nding that Protestantism has shet-
tered the fetters of the sib: perhaps Protestantism (arguably more predominant in harsher
climates) was not the primary cause for weaker family ties, but nature. Viewed in this light,
Protestantism may have tted well as a norm-system in harsher climates.
The results reported here are derived under admittedly heroic simplications. The sibling
interaction that we model is very simple and stylized. Its precise mathematical form, is, of
course, but one out of many possibilities. However, we believe it is canonical for the interplay
between human e¤ort and nature. Of particular interest for future work, would be to develop
models that allow for more than two siblings, parent-child interactions, repeated interactions,
a richer menu of outcomes, etc. We hope that the concept of local evolutionary robustness,
along with the analytical machinery that we have developed here, can be useful for many
other studies of related questions, including studies of a richer menu of family relations.
Also, extension to other types of transmission mechanisms between and within di¤erent
generations, including endogeneous social norms, seem highly relevant to our understanding
of the relationships between family values and economic develpoment; see Hauk and Saez-
Marti (2002), Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Alger and Weibull (2008) for models of other
inter- and intra-generational transmission mechanisms.
28Likewise, we also show that full selshness is non-robust; since if a few individuals in such a society
would become slightly altruistic they would do better in terms of material utility.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proposition 1
Let ^ i : 
 !

0; yH

be the function that denes, for every state ! 2 
, the transfer that
individual i would like to make to his or her sibling if the latter makes no transfer to i. Then
^ i(!) = 0 if u0(yi)  iu0(yj) for j 6= i, otherwise the optimal transfer ^ i(!) is positive and
equates is marginal material utility to that of his siblings when weighted by his own (is)
degree of altruism:
u0(yi   ^ i(!)) = iu0(yj + ^ i(!)):
Since the material utility function is separable in consumption and e¤ort, e¤orts play no role
when determining the transfers, only outputs matter. The claims in Proposition 1 follow
from the following
Lemma 1 For each ! 2 
, the transfer pair (^A(!); ^B(!)) constitutes a Nash equilibrium
of G(!). If AB < 1, then this equilibrium is unique. If A = B = 1, then there is a
continuum of Nash equilibria, all resulting in equal sharing of the total output.
Proof: For every state ! 2 
, let ^ i(!) denote the transfer that individual i would like
to make to his or her sibling j if j makes no transfer to i. (This transfer is unique by strict
convavity of u.) Consider rst the two states ! in which yA = yB: Then u0(yi)  iu0(yj)
for i = A;B, i 6= j, implying that ^ i(!) = 0, i = A;B. Moreover, in such states, ^ i(!) = 0
is trivially is unique best response to ^ j(!) = 0 (for i = A;B, i 6= j). This establishes the
claim in the lemma for all such states !.
Secondly, consider the two states ! in which yA 6= yB. Then ^ i(!) = 0 if u0(yi)  iu0(yj)
(for j 6= i) and otherwise ^ i(!) 2 (0; yi) is the unique solution to the rst-order condition
u0(yi   ^ i(!)) = iu0(yj + ^ i(!)):
Suppose that yA > yB. It follows that then (^A(!); 0) is a Nash equilibrium of G (!). If
AB = 1, then this equilibrium is not unique, since also (^A(!) + "; ") is a Nash equilibrium
for all " 2 (0; yA   ^A(!)). Likewise, if yA < yB, then (0; ^B(!)) is a Nash equilibrium of
G (!), and, if AB = 1, so are ("0; ^B(!) + "0) for all "0 2 (0; yB   ^B(!)). This establishes
the rst and third claim in the lemma.
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As for the second claim, suppose that AB < 1 and consider the state ! in which
yA > yB. If u0(yA)  Au0(yB), then ^A(!) = 0 and (0; 0) is the uniqe Nash equilibrium
of G (!). Suppose that u0(yA) < Au0(yB). Suppose that (tA; tB) is a Nash equilibrium of
G (!). If tB = 0, then tA = ^A(!) is necessary. Clearly, 0 = tA < tB is incompatible with
equilibrium. It remains to show that also tA; tB > 0 is incompatible with equilibrium. This
can be established by way of proof by contradiction. Suppose, thus that (tA; tB) is a Nash
equilibrium with tA; tB > 0. Then the following two rst-order conditions must both hold:
u0(yA   tA + tB) = Au0(yB + tA   tB)
u0(yB + tA   tB) = Bu0(yA   tA + tB)
and hence
u0(yA   tA + tB) = ABu0(yA   tA + tB)
implying AB = 1, contradicting our hypothesis that AB < 1. The same reasoning
applies to the state ! in which yA < yB. This establishes the second claim in the lemma.
8.2 Proposition 2
The rst-order condition (6) implicitly denes the transfer t as a di¤erentiable function of
. An application of the implicit function theorem gives
dt
d
=   u
00 (Y + t)
u00 (Y + t) + u00 (Y   t)  Y;
where, by strict concavity of u, the ratio on the right-hand side is a number in the open unit
interval. Hence
d (Y + t)
d
=

1  u
00 (Y + t)
u00 (Y + t) + u00 (Y   t)

 Y > 0;
and
d (Y   t)
d
=
u00 (Y + t)
u00 (Y + t) + u00 (Y   t)  Y > 0:
8.3 Proposition 3
First, assume that A; B < ^ (). Then T (A) = T (B) = 0, and inspection of (11)
shows that the equation system (10) is independent of A and B. Hence, its solution set is
una¤ected by a marginal increase in any one or both of these parameters.
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Second, assume that condition (12) is met. Then the Jacobian of the equation system
(10) is non-null, a condition, which, by the Inversion Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 41.8 in
Bartle, 1976), guarantees local uniqueness of the solution to (3). Suppose that i > ^ ().
Step 1: First, we prove that, for each success probability of the other individual, pj,
individual is best response is strictly increasing in i. From (10) and noting that ( 
0) 1 is
an increasing function, this claim holds if
@g (pj; i; j)
@i
> 0:
Using the rst-order condition (6) for the transfer T (i), we obtain:
@g (pj; i; j)
@i
= (1  pj)  [u (Y + T (i))  u (Y )] + pj  [u (Y )  u (Y   T (j))] : (25)
The expression on the right-hand side is positive, since i > ^ () implies T (i) > 0.
Step 2: Secondly, we prove that an increase in i does not lead to an increase in pj. For
this claim, it is su¢ cient to show that
@g (pj; i; j)
@j
 0:
Using the rst-order condition (6) for the transfer T (j), we obtain:
@g (pj; i; j)
@j
=  pj  (1  ij)  u0 (Y + T (j))T 0 (j) : (26)
The expression on the right-hand side is negative for all j  ^ () and zero for all j < ^ ().
Taken together, the two steps establish the claim in the proposition.
8.4 Proposition 4
Using equation (14), we obtain
dp
d
=
(1  p)
K
 [u (Y + T ())  u (Y )] + p

K
 [u (Y )  u (Y   T ())]
 p
 (1  2)
K
 u0 (Y + T ())T 0 () (27)
where
K =
 00 (p)
(1  ) + (1 + ) ([u (Y + T ())  u (Y )]  [u (Y )  u (Y   T ())]) : (28)
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As  # ^ (), at which point p is not di¤erentiable, the rst two terms in (27) both
tend to zero, while the third term is positive. Since it is to be subtracted, we conclude that
dp=d < 0 for all  > ^ () close to ^ (). Likewise, as  " 1, the third term tends to zero
while the rst two are positive. Hence, dp=d > 0 for all  < 1 close to 1.
8.5 Proposition 5
Using equation (14), we obtain
dp
d
=  (1  p
)Y
K
 [u0 (Y )  u0 (Y + t)]  (1  p
)Y
K
 u0 (Y )
 p
2Y
K
 u0 (Y + t)  p
 (1  2)
K

Y +
dt
d

 u0 (Y + t) :
where t is dened in (6) and K > 0 in (28). Since u is strictly increasing and concave, and
jdt=dj < Y (see proof of proposition 2), dp=d < 0.
8.6 Proposition 6
We proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the socially optimal probability p and transfer
t, to be given by the rich to the poor, under a Benthamite social welfare function. Secondly,
we verify that these coincide with the equilibrium probabilities pA and p

B, and transfers
T (A) and T (B) if and only if A = B = 1.
Step 1: Consider a hypothetical social planner who chooses a probability p and transfer
t so as to maximize the sum of the expected material utilities to each individual,
W (p; t) = 2

(1  ) p2u (Y ) + (1  ) (1  p)2 + u (Y ) (29)
+2 (1  ) p (1  p) [u (Y   t) + u (Y + t)]  2 (p) :
The necessary rst-order condition for an interior solution for p is
2pu (Y )  2 (1  p)u (Y ) + (1  2p) [u (Y   t) + u (Y + t)] =  
0 (p)
(1  ) : (30)
Moreover, for any value of p, the value of t that maximizes W (p; t) is such that both
individuals end up with the same consumption in all states: Y   t = Y + t.
Step 2: When positive, the equilibrium transfer satises (6). Strict concavity of u implies
that Y   T () = Y + T () if and only if  = 1. Hence,  = 1 is a necessary condition
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for the equilibrium outcome to coincide with the Benthamite optimum. It is also a su¢ cient
condition, since the rst-order condition that denes the equilibrium success probability p,
equation (14), for T () = (1  )Y=2, coincides with (30), the necessary rst-order condition
for an interior social optimum, if and only if  = 1.
8.7 Corollary 1
Given the symmetry of the unique equilibrium outcome, this is Pareto e¢ cient if and only
if it maximizes the sum of both individualsexpected welfare, as dened in equation (4).
If each individual chooses a success probability p and gives a transfer t when rich and the
other is poor, the mentioned sum is S(p; t) = (1 + )W (p; t), where W (p; t) is dened in
(29). For any  2 [0; 1], S(p; t) is clearly strictly increasing in W (p; t). But, by proposition
6, the equilibrium expected material utility V  coincides with the maximum value ofW (p; t)
if and only if  = 1.
8.8 Proposition 7
The claim in the proposition holds if
lim#^()

@V (; )
@
+
@V (; )
@

j=
> 0;
where V (; ) is dened in (22). Here V (; ) is the expected equilibrium material utility
to an individual whose degree of altruism is  and whose siblings degree of altruism is
. Likewise, p (; ) is the individuals own success probability and p (; ) that of the
sibling. Such a pair of success probabilities necessarily satisfy the following system of rst-
order equations, a generalization of (10):8>>>><>>>>:
1
1  
0 [p (; )] = [1  p (; )]  (u [Y   T ()] + u [Y + T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )])
 p (; )  (u [Y + T ()] + u [Y   T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )]) + [u(Y )  u(Y )]
1
1  
0 [p (; )] = [1  p (; )]  (u [Y   T ()] + u [Y + T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )])
 p (; )  (u [Y + T ()] + u [Y   T ()]  [u (Y ) + u (Y )]) + [u(Y )  u(Y )] :
(31)
Letting V1 and V2 denote the partial derivatives of V with respect to the rst and second
argument, respectively, and likewise, using p1 and p

2 to denote the partial derivatives of p

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with respect to the rst and second argument, respectively, we get:
V1 (; ) = (1  ) [p (; ) p1 (; ) + p (; ) p2 (; )]u (Y ) (32)
  (1  ) ([1  p (; )] p1 (; ) + [1  p (; )] p2 (; ))u (Y )
+ (1  ) ([1  p (; )] p1 (; )  p (; ) p2 (; ))u [Y   T ()]
  (1  ) (p (; ) p1 (; )  [1  p (; )] p2 (; ))u [Y + T ()]
  (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]u0 [Y   T ()]T 0 ()
  0 [p (; )] p1 (; )
and
V2 (; ) = (1  ) [p (; ) p2 (; ) + p (; ) p1 (; )]u (Y ) (33)
  (1  ) ([1  p (; )] p2 (; ) + [1  p (; )] p1 (; ))u (Y )
+ (1  ) ([1  p (; )] p2 (; )  p (; ) p1 (; ))u [Y   T ()]
  (1  ) (p (; ) p2 (; )  [1  p (; )] p1 (; ))u [Y + T ()]
+ (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]u0 [Y + T ()]T 0 ()
  0 [p (; )] p2 (; ) :
From the equation system (31) we have:
 0 [p (; )] = (1  ) p (; ) (1 + )u (Y )
  (1  ) [1  p (; )] (1 + )u (Y )
+ (1  ) [1  p (; )] [u (Y   T ()) + u (Y + T ())]
  (1  ) p (; ) [u (Y + T ()) + u (Y   T ())] :
Using this to replace  0 [p (; )] in (32) and (33), and simplifying yields
V1 (; ) = (1  ) [p (; ) p2 (; )  p (; ) p1 (; )]u (Y )
  (1  ) ([1  p (; )] p2 (; )   [1  p (; )] p1 (; ))u (Y )
  (1  ) p (; ) p2 (; )u [Y   T ()]
+ (1  ) p (; ) p1 (; )u [Y   T ()]
+ (1  ) [1  p (; )] p2 (; )u [Y + T ()]
  (1  ) [1  p (; )] p1 (; )u [Y + T ()]
  (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]u0 [Y   T ()]T 0 ()
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and
V2 (; ) = (1  ) [p (; ) p1 (; )  p (; ) p2 (; )]u (Y )
  (1  ) ([1  p (; )] p1 (; )   [1  p (; )] p2 (; ))u (Y )
  (1  ) p (; ) p1 (; )u [Y   T ()]
+ (1  ) p (; ) p2 (; )u [Y   T ()]
+ (1  ) [1  p (; )] p1 (; )u [Y + T ()]
  (1  ) [1  p (; )] p2 (; )u [Y + T ()]
+ (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]u0 [Y + T ()]T 0 () :
Evaluating these two expressions at (; ) = (; ), and rearranging terms, we obtain
V1 (; ) = (1  ) p (; ) [p2 (; )  p1 (; )] (u (Y )  u [Y   T ()]) (34)
+(1  ) [1  p (; )] [p2 (; )  p1 (; )] (u [Y + T ()]  u (Y ))
  (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]u0 [Y   T ()]T 0 ()
and
V2 (; ) = (1  ) p (; ) [p1 (; )  p2 (; )] (u (Y )  u [Y   T ()]) (35)
+(1  ) [1  p (; )] [p1 (; )  p2 (; )] (u [Y + T ()]  u (Y ))
+ (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]u0 [Y + T ()]T 0 () :
Finally, using the rst-order equation (6) that denes T () for  > ^ (), and rearranging
terms, we get:
V1 (; ) + V2 (; ) = (1  ) (1  ) [p1 (; ) + p2 (; )] 
(p (; ) [u (Y )  u (Y   T ())] + [1  p (; )] [u (Y + T ())  u (Y )])
+ (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )] (1  )u0 (Y + T ())T 0 () :
This tends to a positive number as  tends to ^ () from above, since the rst two terms
then tend to zero while the last term tends to a positive number.
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8.9 Proposition 9
Using the expressions in (34) and (35) for the partial derivatives V1 and V2, we obtain from
(19):
D () =

V1(; ) +
1
2
V2(; )

= (1  ) p (; ) [1  p (; )]

1
2
u0 [Y + T ()]  u0 [Y   T ()]

T 0 ()
+ (1  )

1
2
  

p1 (; ) +

1  
2

p2 (; )


 [p (; ) (u (Y )  u [Y   T ()]) + [1  p (; )] (u [Y + T ()]  u (Y ))] :
Recalling that T () = 0 for all  < ^ (), that p1 > 0 and p

2 < 0 for all  > ^ (),
see Proposition 3, and that p1 + p

2 < 0 for  slightly above ^ (), see Proposition 4, it is
straightforward to show that the drift function D has the following properties:
1. D () = 0 for all  < ^ ().
2. D is continuous at each  2 A.
3. lim#^() > 0, ^ () < 1=2, and lim#^() < 0, ^ () > 1=2.
4. D (1=2) < 0 , ^ () < 1=2.
8.10 Corollary 2
Assume that  < ^ and that the success probabilties are exogeneously xed and equal:
pA = pB = p 2 (0; 1). For every  2 int (A) we then have
D () = (1  ) p (1  p) 

1
2
u0 [Y + T ()]  u0 [Y   T ()]

T 0 () ; (36)
where T 0 () > 0 for all  > ^ (). Since T () satises the rst-order condition (6) for all
such , we have, for every  2 int (A) exceeding ^ () < 1=2:
D () = (1  ) p (1  p) 

1
2
  

u0 [Y + T ()]T 0 () :
By Proposition 9, such an  is locally evolutionarily robust if and only if  = 1=2. Clearly no
  ^ () is locally evolutionarily robust, since then -siblings give not transfers and an 0-
sibling does just as well, for any 0 < . From (22) we obtain thatA = f 2 [0; 1] :  6= ^ ()g.
In particular, (^ () ; 1)  int (A). Hence,  = 1=2 is the only locally robust degree of altru-
ism.
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